(see Luce and Raiffa, 1957) . SIDIP implies that the subject does not use the conventional computational processes dictated by those criteria.
I. Introduction

A. Setting
The problems of individual decision making have been classified by Luce and Raiffa (1957) as decision making under (i) certainty, (2) risk, (3) uncertainty, and (4) partial ignorance (a IB combination of risk and uncertainty). These four classes of decision problems are defined in terms of knowledge of the probability distribution over the states of nature, given the usual decision theoretic formulation (decision maker; choices, acts, or alternatives; states of nature; payoffs) of a decision situation. Thus, decision making under certainty is trivial from a decision theoretic point of view.
Normative decision theory prescribes choice for a given structure and classification (risk, uncertainty, or partial ignorance) by specifying a criterion of choice. Normative theory prescribes in the sense that, if the criterion and formulation are accepted, choice is unambiguous.
There are several decision theories --meaning that for certain conditions there are several "reasonable" choice criteria.
It is well known that people do not always behave in a manner consistent with various normative decision theories. The descriptive failures of normative criteria are documented elsewhere (e.g., under risk, MacCrimmon, 1969; under uncertainty, Tuggle, 1972; under partial ignorance, Barron, 1970) . Since these experimental results were derived from laboratory studies using reasonably artificial problems, it is likely that actual decisions made daily by decision makers facing complex real-world problems would also exhibit inconsistencies with normative theory.
In this paper we choose to study decision making under uncertainty. We believe partial ignorance is a reasonable representation of real world decision problems; however, several proposed approaches for dealing with partial ignorance first reformulate the problem as decision making under uncertainty.
(Those who subscribe to a subjective or personalistic theory of probability would convert partial ignorance to risk.
We temporarily reject risk since in manyproblems the probabilities are, at best, vaguely known and the decision maker is unwilling to accept the probability estimates for decision making purposes.) Other possible approaches to partial ignorance include deciding "as if" it were an uncertainty situation or deciding "as if" it were risk (i.e., maximize expected value or expected utility), but first rejecting (or considering) alternatives based on uncertainty criteria.
These approaches place heavy emphasis on decision-making under uncertainty.
B. Proposal
Our aim is to study individual human decision-making under uncertainty so as to learn how decision processes are used and how to introduce realistic modifications into a person's cognitive behavioral repertoire so that he makes an optimal decision. This paper puts heaviest weight on unravelling and simulating nonoptimal decision processes; later papers will address the second subgoal of internalizing different cognitive processes.
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In order to ensure that our understanding of current (suboptimal) human decision-making processes is explicit, operational, and falsifiable,
we have encoded our model as a computer simulation program. Our program, entitled SIDIP for Simulation of l_ndividual Decision-making through l_nformation P_rocessing, is described in detail
in Section IV and is tested and analyzed in Section V.
In order to have a framework in which to express our model, we chose the Information Procesing System (IPS) approach of Newell and Simon (1972 was written (see Section IV) to simulate the essential parts of S's decision-making behavior.
Goodness-of-fit tests of SIDIP's behavior to S's behavior are performed in Section V. Action recommendations are made in Section VI.
The subject was faced by nine decision situations, which were sequentially presented to him.
The nine decision situations are independent; S was not permitted to see the next situation until he had made a final choice on the previous one.
After all nine choices had been made, a single situation was selected by the experimenter (E) to be played for real money. The entire session with S lasted about 50 minutes.
A. Decision Problems
The nine situations faced by S were tabulated as nine different payoff matrices for uncertain decisions. In Table i had all positive payoffs; matrices 2, 5, and 8
had both positive and negative payoffs; and matrices 3, 6, and 9 had all negative payoffs.
Additionally, matrices 7, 8, and 9 had significantly larger numeric entries than matrices i through 6 (an average of 9.23 versus 5.29, respectively).
The subject could exhibit inconsistent choice behavior using these matrices (he could select a row corresponding to one decision criterion on one matrix and corresponding to a different decision criterion on another matrix) and/or suboptimal choice behavior (he could select a row dominated by another). Previous experimentation (Tuggle, 1972) shows that subjects (undergraduate and graduate students and practicing managers) exhibit both of these behaviors on these very problems. However, this S, in fact, very large or very small payoff, or a number of "strong" or "weak" payoffs).
Third~ he partitioned, explicitly and implicitly, his eight action alternatives into three sets (while sequentially examining them):
those that he dislikes (a "reject" list), those that appeal to him (a "consider" list), and those that received no verbal indications (an "ignore" list).
Fourth, a choice was made from those alternatives that are present on the "consider" list.
In the case of numerous alternatives, a pairwise comparison and rejecting process is used. From S's protocol, the data led us to infer the following comparison process:
(i) S never talked about computing a sum (row sum or column sum) or an expected value.
(2) Of all the numbers S verbalized, he never verbalized one that was close to a sum or an expected value. attempting to isolate identifying characteristics of the four columns so as to be able to assign subjective probability estimates to them.
For example, on matrix 7, S noted that in one column there is a larger proportion of the larger payoffs in the matrix~ and he tentatively concluded that that column had a lesser chance of occurring. However, in each case, S apparently eventually discarded that "column- evidence --pro, con, and irrelevant--to the
A. Data Structures
The primary reason behind the selection of L6 as our language was its ability to construct and manipulate complex data structures. According to Newell and Simon (1972, pp. 19ff.) (and implicitly, we presume S has the capabilities of) these EIPs: the ability to create attribute information such as described in Part A, the ability to retrieve, compare, and distinguish such information, the ability to input (hear or read, for S and SIDIP, respectively) and to output (speak or print) symbolic information, the ability to do simple numeric processing (e.g., to add two numbers, to recognize that 7 > 5 and that -4 < -3, to save intermediate results ' , and the ability to interpret a 20 program of EIPs.
These are the only SIPs we require of SlDIP, and the only ones we posit about S. The sufficiency of these EIPs for SIDIP will be empirically demonstrated indirectly and implicitly in Section V. The necessity of these EIPs for S does not violate anything we now know about the cognitive capabilities of humans.
C. Macroprograms
In this part we shall indicate how SIDIP operates, primarily by reference to its flowcharts in Figures 2, 3 , 4, and 5 and by reference to the output it produces, such as in Table   none Print Out Current 1
Decision Table ] Initialize Attributes for the Table  and its S chose the expected value row in these four cases; SIDIP also chose the expected value row and respectively chose the regret row, the maximin row, the maximax row, and the maxlmin row in addition.
B. Performance Tests
To gain insight into the ability of SIDIP to simulate S's decisions, we shall compare its
We shall continue to confuse the maximum expected value criterion and the Laplacian criterion --which presumes a uniform probability distribution.
S I looks good because of the maximum table value S I looks pretty good, large numbers Since we feel that it is too harsh to assume that a "half-right" choice is entirely wrong, we are forced to judge SIDIP's choices based on the ~t Z 6 aLLd m6 ~cores. Consequently, we conclude that SIDIP's performance is significantly superior to the choices generated by these two random models of decision-making.
Next we could test "as if" choice behavior.
The null hypotheses become S chooses "as if" he is using a maximax (or maximin, or minimax regret, or Laplace --expected value) criterion.
We cannot reject such hypotheses on a purely statistical basis (unless something like a strong The statistical tests that have been run so far on SIDIP suggest our simulation is significantly better than random decision models. The numbers and kinds of articulated behaviors summarized in Thus we conclude that SIDIP explains reasonably well the nucleus of our subject's decisionmaking processes, but that there are still peripheral processes of importance by S that the current SIDIP does not capture.
B. Incremental Improvement in Decision-Making
Given the caveats in the previous part, it is obviously premature to press forward strongly in the area of improving decision-making processes by studying simulations of individuals.
In order to conclude the research thrust begun in this paper, though, we shall pretend that SIDIP is near 100% successful to sketch the remaining work to be accomplished.
Assuming (heroically) that SIDIP adequately simulates the decision processes of S, we can now perform experiments upon the computer simulation program. Suppose, by way of illustration, that S articulates a desire to behave in a manner consistent with the maximize expected value criterion, but S does not consistently do so.
Then an easy way to change SIDIP so that it behaves in that manner is to alter the COMPARE subroutine: after reordering the columns within the two rows (from highest payoff to lowest), do not compare the columns by simply noting "above," "below," or "equal." Instead, determine and record how much above or below one row's column is over the other. Total these differences, and the row with the higher sum is then the row with larger expected value.
Once it is learned that the suggested Second, protocols from more subjects should be collected so that more can be learned about the actual decision-making processes of humans.
Third, experiments should be conducted to learn a training procedure that is successful at modifying decision-making processes.
Fourth, this entire paradigm should eventually be moved out of the laboratory and into the real world. Ultimately, it is not the decision-making processes of college students that one is interested in studying, simulating, 
